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THE TIPPING POINT – REEVALUATING
THE ASNEF-EQUIFAX SEPARATION
OF COMPETITION OF DATA PRIVACY
LAW IN THE WAKE OF THE 2017
EQUIFAX DATA BREACH
Olivia A. Altmayer
Abstract: Contrary to the Court of Justice for the European Union’s decision in
the Asnef-Equifax case, in a world of big data, it is inefficient and ineffective to
treat EU competition law and EU data protection law as entirely separate legal
considerations. Reevaluating this stance is critical in sectors where customer
data is highly sensitive, and therefore highly valuable to those who steal it,
particularly for the financial and healthcare sectors. Looking forward, companies
that store and use biometric data will have to be similarly scrutinized.
To correct this problem, the EU has numerous paths it can take: (a) continue as
is, treating competition and data protection as separate legal considerations, (b)
enact a new body of regulatory law to specifically deal with data protection and
competition, or (c) begin using existing competition law, specifically Article 101
of the TFEU, to address data protection concerns. This paper will argue that to
best serve the interests of all relevant players – government, businesses, and
consumers – option (c) is the optimal choice. Additionally, in implementing this
change, the EU can use the FRAND patent and competition law precedence in
devising a new data protection and competition framework.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since 2006 when the Court of Justice decided the Asnef-Equifax case1
for the European Union (EU), the landscape of data security has changed
drastically. Of the eighteen largest data breaches of all time, only two
occurred before 2010 and both were tied to the same hacker.2 Of the breaches
that have occurred since, the 2017 Equifax breach is thought to be the most
dangerous because the data stolen from an estimated 143 million consumers
included social security numbers, which are characterized as extremely
sensitive data.3 Breaches that involve such a vast swath of sensitive consumer
information pose a real threat to economic security.4 It is clear, then, that
governments need to take additional steps to combat a heightened threat to
the security of sensitive information. This is especially true for credit and
medical information which are of most value to hackers and therefore most
at risk.5
One possible approach to increasing the protection on this sensitive data
is incorporating data protection analysis into competition law review when
private companies propose or challenge mergers. There is precedent for this
sort of combined approach regime with patents and competition law in the
EU. The situation appears ripe for creative solutions when it comes to big
companies and the protection of consumer data and information. The EU is
taking steps to drastically increase the strength of its data protection laws,
with the introduction of General Data Protection Regulation, which took
effect in May 2018. During the same time frame, the European Commission
has also increased competition law scrutiny on companies operating in the
EU. Adding a review of data protection policies and procedures would be a
good way for the government to mitigate the problem of increased data
security threats and make the data and information of European consumers
safer. However, it is much less clear that such a regime would be embraced
or effective in other jurisdictions, especially the United States.
1
Case C-238/05, Asnef-Equifax, Servicios de Información sobre Solvencia y Crédito,
SL and Administación del Estado Asociación de Usuarios de Servicios Bancarios (Ausbanc),
2006 E.C.R I-11125 [hereinafter Asnef-Equifax].
2
Computer hacker Albert Gonzalez was held responsible for both the 2006 TJX
Companies, Inc. breach and the 2008 Heartland Payment Systems breach. Taylor Armerding,
The
18
Biggest
Breaches
of
the
21st
Century,
CSO
ONLINE
https://www.csoonline.com/article/2130877/data-breach/the-biggest-data-breaches-of-the21st-century.html (last updated Dec. 20, 2018).
3
Tara Siegel Bernard, Tiffany Hsu, Nicole Perlroth & Ron Lieber, Equifax Says
Cyberattack May Have Affected 143 Million in the U.S., N. Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/07/business/equifax-cyberattack.html?_r=0.
4
Id.
5
Credit information is tied to an individual through their social security number or other
national identification number. Aatif Sulleyman, NHS Cyber Attack: Why Stolen Medical
Information Is So Much More Valuable Than Financial Data, INDEPENDENT (May 12,
2017),
http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/nhs-cyber-attackmedical-data-records-stolen-why-so-valuable-to-sell-financial-a7733171.html.

39

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

39:37 (2018)

This note focuses on an observable intersection of data protection and
competition law to create a more efficient regulatory environment with the
goal of offering consumers the best protection for their personal data at the
least cost for the companies storing and processing that data. Part I will
review competition law and its recent developments in Europe. Part II will
focus on data protection law’s development in the EU and the US. Part III
will analyze the decision made by the Court of Justice for the EU in the 2006
Asnef-Equifax case. Part IV will propose possible choices for the EU in
combating the possible failings of the current system. Finally, Part V will
serve as the conclusion and discuss the optimal strategy going forward for
the EU in this area of the law.
II. COMPETITION LAW
A. History of Competition Law
In preparing to discuss the intersection of competition law and data
protection law in the EU at present, it is first important to review the origins
and purposes of both bodies of law. Competition law is the older of the two
and can trace its roots back to ancient times. There is evidence that
competition law dates back to ancient Greece6 and Egypt.7 The modern
iteration of competition law began in the late 19th century in the United
States with the passage of the Sherman Act, which focused on preserving the
competitive market and benefiting consumers through fair prices.8
The Chicago School approach to competition law has been dominant in
both the United States and Europe since the 1970s.9 This approach requires
an assessment of market structure, company behavior, and company
performance in the market to determine whether a company’s conduct
violates competition law.10 Additional competition law concerns include
protecting the free market from “artificial restraints,”11 ensuring the efficient
allocation of resources, and recognizing barriers to entry for would-be market
players.12 Horizontal sharing of information is one of the ways that
companies reduce competition in the market, which was the point of concern
in the Asnef-Equifax case13 and is a primary component of the credit bureau

6

THE EC LAW OF COMPETITION 5 (Jonathan Faull & Ali Nikpay eds., 2d ed. 2007).
Lorenzo F. Pace, EUROPEAN ANTITRUST LAW: PROHIBITIONS, MERGER CONTROL AND
PROCEDURES 3 (2007).
8
Frederic Sautet, The Shaky Foundations of Competition Law, N.Z. L.J. 186, 189-90
(2007).
9
THE EC LAW OF COMPETITION, supra note 6, at 8.
10 Id.
11 Erich Hoppmann, Workable Competition - The Development of an Idea on the Norm
for the Policy of Competition, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 61 (1968).
12 Pace, supra note 7, at 39.
13 Asnef-Equifax, supra note 1, at I-11125.
7
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industry.14
B. Competition Policy in the EU
Competition policy in the European Union began in March of 1957 with
the Treaty of Rome, in which Articles 85 and 86 of the European Economic
Community (EEC) were some of the first treaty provisions to have a direct
effect on the EU.15 As of 2007, these provisions are Articles 101 and 10216
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).17 In 1962,
the European Commission, the EU’s politically independent executive
body,18 received the direct power to enforce competition law under
Regulation 17, later superseded by Regulation 1/2003.19 The Commission is
“responsible for the implementation and orientation of Community
competition policy.”20 The European Court of Justice (ECJ), the highest court
in the European Union, ensures that the interpretation and application of EU
law is consistent across member states.21 In the competition law arena, the
ECJ ensures stability of the law and maintains preeminence over national
laws. The ECJ has also interpreted Articles 85 and 86 to be real applicable
law and not merely policy guidelines.22 The ECJ is further responsible for
protecting the rights of private individuals under antitrust law.23 Together,
the European Commission and the ECJ give teeth to the European Union’s
competition policy.
The European Commission and the ECJ have two avenues to enforce
competition law in the EU. The first is enforcement through merger control,
and the second is legal action for violation of Article 101 or 102. The
European Commission is tasked with assessing the effects of a merger on the
market and has the sole power to make decisions regarding whether a
proposed merger is in compliance with Regulation 139/04.24 The two phases
of merger review are: (i) assessment of whether the market concentration
may create a threat to competition; and if a threat is present (ii) a more
14 Marc Rothemund & Maria Gerhardt, The European Credit Information Landscape: An
analysis of a survey of credit bureaus in Europe, ECRI INDUSTRY SURVEY 2 (Jan. 2011).
15 THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EU COMPETITION LAW 1 (Kiran Klaus Patel & Heike
Schweitzer eds., 2013).
16 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2012
O.J. (C 326) 47 [hereinafter TFEU].
17 THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EU COMPETITION LAW, supra note 15, at 1.
18 EUROPEAN
COMMISSION, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/institutionsbodies/european-commission_en (last visited Nov. 4, 2017).
19 THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EU COMPETITION LAW, supra note 15, at 1.
20 PACE, supra note 7, at 199.
21 COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (CJEU), https://europa.eu/europeanunion/about-eu/institutions-bodies/court-justice_en (last visited Nov. 4, 2017).
22 THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EU COMPETITION LAW, supra note 15, at 10.
23 PACE, supra note 7, at 206.
24 Id. at 357.
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thorough assessment of the threats to competition which may culminate in a
decision to block the merger.25 Article 21(2) of Regulation 139/0426 serves
as a check on this review power, saying that the Commission’s exclusive
power is subject to review by the Court of Justice.27 Regulation 1/200328
specifically grants jurisdiction to national courts to hear antitrust cases.29
Finally, if the European Commission finds that there has been an antitrust
infringement, then the Commission should propose measures to end the
infringement.30 If that fails, then the Commission is to record the
infringement in a reasoned decision.31 Therefore, both the courts and
Commission can impose penalties for uncured antitrust infringement.32
Competition law in Europe, “the set of laws which ensure that
competition in the marketplace is not restricted in a way that is detrimental
to society,” is distinct from U.S. antitrust law.33 European case law conveys
a special responsibility on firms holding a dominant market position to make
sure that their conduct does not distort or lessen competition.34 Governmental
interventions under competition law are to only occur when “they can be
shown to maximize welfare overall.”35 Therefore, especially in Europe, one
can consider competition law as a means to protect social welfare.36
C. Recent Developments in EU Competition Policy
The European Commission has been very active recently in bringing
competition law enforcement actions against tech giants like Facebook,
Google, Microsoft, and Apple. By doing so, they are walking the fine line
between addressing concerns of market failures and public policy, risking the
real possibility of suppressing innovation through excessive intervention.37
25

Id.
Council Regulation 139/2004 of Jan. 20, 2004, On the Control of Concentrations
between Undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation), 2004 O.J. (L 24) 1, 17 [hereinafter Merger
Regulation].
27 Pace, supra note 7, at 357.
28 Council Regulation 1/2003 of Dec. 16, 2002, On the Implementation of the Rules on
Competition Laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1.
29 Pace, supra note 7, at 310.
30 Id. at 209.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 210.
33 Massimo Motta, COMPETITION POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 30 (2004).
34 Communication from the Commission – Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement
Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by
Dominant Undertakings, COM (2009) 2009/C 45/02 final (Feb. 24, 2009), http://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52009XC0224(01)&from=EN.
35 THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EU COMPETITION LAW, supra note 15, at 2.
36 See Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer
Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020, 1025 (1987).
37 Peter Alexiadis, Forging a European Competition Policy Response to Online
Platforms, 18 BUS. L. INT’L (IBA) 91, 93-94 (May 2017).
26
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The underlying principle for this increased scrutiny goes back to the
European idea that when a firm is dominant in a market, it faces a heightened
responsibility for ensuring that its actions do not lessen competition.38
Increasingly, the European Commission has been looking for anticompetitive conduct related to the treatment of data by these technology
companies, in part because of a drastic increase in the data volume processed
and held and a substantial increase in electronic communication.39
The first big case was the review of the Google and DoubleClick
merger, which the European Commission cleared after going through the
merger review process in 2007.40 At this point in time Google was the most
popular internet search engine and was offered to users for free, and
DoubleClick was a U.S. entity that sold “ad serving, management and
reporting technology worldwide to website publishers, advertisers and
advertising agencies.”41 What concerned the European Commission was the
potential foreclosure effect on the online advertising market.42 However, the
transaction ended up being approved because the Commission found that the
switching costs were not cost-prohibitive for publishers and customers to
switch between providers within the online advertisement market.43 The U.S.
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) similarly cleared the transaction.44 One
FTC Commissioner, Pamela Jones Harbour, dissented to the majority
decision because she felt that the decision did not adequately address the
competition concerns and the privacy interests of consumers, but in this
viewpoint she stood alone.45
The European Commission also reviewed Microsoft’s acquisitions of
Skype and LinkedIn. In 2011, the European Commission received notice that
Microsoft was planning to acquire Skype.46 The European Commission
cleared this transaction because it decided that the common market would
38

Commission Communication, supra note 34.
Monika Kuschewsky & Damien Geradin, Data Protection in the Context of
Competition Law Investigations: An Overview of the Challenges, 37 WORLD COMPETITION L.
& ECON. REV. 69 (2014).
40 Summary of Commission Decision in Case COMP/M.4731 of 11 Mar. 2008, 2008 O.J.
(C 184) 10.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 11-12.
43 Id.
44 Federal Trade Commission, Statement Concerning Google/DoubleClick, FTC File No.
071-0170
(Dec.
20,
2007),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/418081/071220googledccommstmt.pdf.
45
Pamela Jones Harbour, Dissenting Statement in the Matter of Google/DoubleClick,
FTC
File
No.
071-0170
(Dec.
20,
2007),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/statement-mattergoogle/doubleclick/071220harbour_0.pdf.
46 Prior Notification of a Concentration in Case COMP/M.6281 of 10 Sept. 2011, 2011
O.J. (C 268) 12.
39
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not be significantly impacted as a result of the merger.47 With Microsoft’s
2016 acquisition of LinkedIn, the Commission was stricter. They only
approved the deal subject to certain conditions.48 First, LinkedIn software
would have to be removable from Microsoft products.49 Second, other
professional social network services would have to still be operational on
Microsoft products.50 Finally, LinkedIn competitors would still have to be
able to access the “Microsoft Graph” to help drive new subscribers to their
own competing social networks.51 Despite agreeing to allow this merger,
conditional on the parties meeting the designated conditions, the European
Commission acknowledged having a concern over the privacy effects of
market concentration.52 The worry, brought up at the very end of their
decision, is that the privacy policies of the newly consolidated entity would
become more relaxed as a result of decreased market competition.53
The European Commission also reviewed Facebook’s proposed
acquisition of WhatsApp in 2014.54 At the time, the Commission cleared the
transaction because the concentration of user data after the consolidation was
thought to be a data protection issue, not a competition law issue, with the
Commission specially writing that “any privacy-related concerns flowing
from the increased concentration of data within the control of Facebook as a
result of the transaction do not fall within the scope of EU competition law
rules but within the scope of EU data protection rules.”55 The Commission’s
investigation also revealed that consumers were increasingly concerned with
the privacy and security of their personal information.56
The merger approval in 2014 did not actually end up closing the case
for Facebook. In December 2016, the European Commission decided to
review the decision and sent a Statement of Objections to Facebook, a formal
step in an investigation by which the Commission alerts the company of the
objections it is facing.57 The specific claim was that during the 2014 merger
47 Non-opposition to a Notified Concentration in Case COMP/M.6281 of 22 Nov. 2011,
2011 O.J. (C 341) 2.
48 European Commission Press Release IP/16/4284, Mergers: Commission Approves
Acquisition of LinkedIn by Microsoft, Subject to Condition (Dec. 6, 2016),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-4284_en.htm.
49 Id.
50
Id.
51 Id.
52 Commission
Decision in Case M.8124, ¶ 350 (Dec. 6, 2016),
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m8124_1349_5.pdf.
53 Id.
54 Commission
Decision
in
Case
COMP/M.7217
(Oct.
3,
2014),
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7217_20141003_20310_3962132
_EN.pdf.
55 Id. at ¶ 164.
56 Id. at ¶ 87.
57 European Commission Press Release IP/16/4473, Mergers: Commission Alleges
Facebook Provided Misleading Information about WhatsApp Takeover (Dec. 20, 2016),
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review, Facebook provided misleading information about whether user
accounts of both companies could be matched. In 2014, Facebook said it
would not be able to do so, information which the Commission took into
account when deciding to clear the transaction.58 However, in August 2016,
WhatsApp announced changes to its terms of service and privacy policy
which allowed for the possibility of linking WhatsApp phone numbers with
Facebook user identities, a direct contradiction to the 2014 claims of
Facebook.59 Because Facebook failed to provide correct information in 2014,
the Commission imposed a €110 million fine60 on the company in May
2017.61 This was the first fine of its kind following the adoption of the 2004
Merger Regulation.62
Facebook is also facing a similar complaint in Germany. The Federation
of German Consumer Organizations (VZBV), a German consumer agency,
is investigating whether Facebook abused its dominant market position and
breached German data protection rules through unlawful data sharing.63 If
German authorities find a violation of competition law through a non-market
matter (data protection), that decision could pave the way for the EU to
follow suit.64 Competition Commissioner Margarethe Vestager has
acknowledged as much, saying “it shouldn’t only be the Commission doing
things that are new in terms of developing competition law.”65
Finally, there is precedent in the EU for using competition law to
strengthen regulation for another body of law; specifically, competition law
and patent law. In 2014 there were two cases, Motorola v. Apple66 and
Samsung v. Apple67, which centered on something called “standards” which
“ensure compatibility and interoperability of telecom networks and mobile
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-4473_en.htm.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 See Merger Regulation, supra note 26, at 15. The Merger Regulation allows for the
imposition of a fine up to 1% of the aggregated turnover of a company that intentionally or
negligently provides incorrect or misleading information to the Commission.
61 European Commission Press Release IP/17/1369, Mergers: Commission Fines
Facebook €110 Million for Providing Misleading Information about WhatsApp Takeover
(May 28, 2017), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1369_en.htm.
62 Id.
63 Press Release, VZBV, VZBV Verklagt WhatsApp: Verbraucher Mussen Hoheit Über
Daten Behalten (Jan. 30, 2017), www.vzbv.de/pressemitteilung/vzbv-verklagt-whatsappverbraucher-muessen-hoheit-ueber-daten-behalten.
64 Nuria Boot & Georgios Petropoulos, German Facebook Probe Links Data Protection
and Competition Policy, BRUEGEL BLOG (Mar. 14, 2016), http://bruegel.org/2016/03/germanfacebook-probe-links-data-protection-and-competition-policy/.
65 Foo Yun Chee, German Regulator Wee Suited to Investigate Facebook: EU’s Vestager,
REUTERS (Mar. 7, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-facebook-antitrust/germanregulator-well-suited-to-investigate-facebook-eus-vestager-idUSKCN0W91OB.
66 Commission Decision No. AT.39985, 2014 O.J. (C 344/06).
67 Commission Decision No. AT.39939, 2014 O.J. (C 350/08).
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devices.”68 Standards are composed of “standard-essential patents,” which
are distinct from ordinary patents because they are necessary for standards
and implemented in nearly all of telecommunication devices.69
In Motorola v. Apple, Apple wanted to enter the mobile phone market
and sought to license certain standard-essential patents from Motorola, which
Motorola refused and for which it sought court ordered injunctions.70 Apple
defended itself saying that through its conduct, Motorola was violating
competition law, specifically Article 102 of the TFEU.71 This argument was
successful. The EU Commission held that an injunction was unnecessary and
no fines were ordered for Motorola’s competition violation because of a lack
of case-law precedent.72
In Samsung v. Apple, Samsung sought preliminary and permanent
injunctions against Apple on the basis of some of its standard-essential
patents.73 The Commission viewed the conduct of Samsung between April
2011, when they initially sought the injunctions, and December 2012, when
they withdrew the injunction actions, as possibly violating competition law
under Article 102 of the TFEU.74 In hearing these concerns from the
Commission, Samsung made certain commitments so that no competition
violation proceedings would continue.75 Both cases represent competition
law reaching out to impose limitations or requirements in another body of
law, laying the groundwork for a similar interchange between competition
law and data protection law.
III. DATA PROTECTION LAW
A. History of Data Protection Law
Data protection law, what it is and how it works, is equally important to
understanding the proposal of this paper. Compared to competition law, data
protection law is a much more recent development, and centers largely on the
concept of privacy. In Europe, privacy is a fundamental right, similar to the
right of “freedom of speech” in the United States.76 It is important to note
that there is no fundamental right of privacy in the United States.77 Thus, EU

68

Commission Decision No. AT.39985 at ¶ 5.
Id. at ¶ 6.
70 Id. at ¶ 11-12.
71 See id. at ¶ 20.
72 Id. at ¶ 24-25.
73 Commission Decision No. AT.39939 at ¶ 12.
74
Id. at ¶ 13.
75 Id. at ¶ 14-20.
76 Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1170
(2000).
77 McKay Cunningham, Complying with International Data Protection Law, 84 U. CIN.
L. REV. 421, 422 (2016).
69
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data protection law derives from Europeans’ fundamental right of privacy.78
Scholars made comparisons between intellectual property and personal
information and data, and suggested that a property right should be granted
to individuals by law much like intellectual property rights.79 If personal
information carried a property right, companies seeking to use that
information could license it, but would also leave the individual the choice
of whether to license.80 No such property right exists in the U.S., but Europe
took a rights-based approach to its data protection regulatory regime.81 With
society’s increased reliance on technology, data protection concerns have
come to the forefront as have questions about the best way to protect personal
information.
The purpose of data protection law is to regulate and offer governmental
protection to the increasing amount of digital data that moves between
individuals, between organizations, or from an individual to an organization
or vice versa.82 Mechanisms invoked by this body of law to achieve its goals
are minimum standards for organizational privacy policies and specific
procedures for when a breach occurs. One complication that has continued
to come up is data that flows between countries with different data protection
laws, a function of the global interconnectivity provided by the internet.83
Ensuring compliance with all data protection laws can be difficult, and most
companies with international operations must comply with the strictest set of
rules. Contradictions between such laws, especially between the lax and
sometimes disjointed approach of the U.S. and the strict approach of the EU,
make for a difficult and costly regulatory environment for international
companies to navigate.84
B. Data Protection Policy in the EU
In the EU, data protection law has developed much more uniformly than
it has in the United States.85 This is partly a reaction toward Nazism and is
also due to Europe’s treatment of privacy as a fundamental right since the
end of World War II.86 Europeans experienced the havoc the Nazis and other
fascists were able to wreak using census records, classified files – private and
personal information – and understood the need for ensuring that such
78 Tracie B. Loring, Comment, An Analysis of the Informational Privacy Protection
Afforded by the European Union and the United States, 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 421, 422 (2002).
79 Samuelson, supra note 76, at 1126-27.
80 Id. at 1129.
81 See McKay Cunningham, Privacy in the Age of the Hacker: Balancing Global Privacy
and Data Security Law, 44 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 643, 668 (2012); Samuelson, supra note
76, at 1128.
82 Cunningham, supra note 77, at 422.
83 Id. at 434-35.
84 Id. at 421.
85 Loring, supra note 78.
86 Samuelson, supra note 76, at 1170-71.
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information is as well protected as possible.87
The German state of Hesse enacted the first comprehensive data
protection law in 1970.88 Afterwards, six unifying principles formed the
foundation of further European data protection legislation.89 These principles
are openness, individual access and correction, collection limitation, use
limitation, disclosure limitation, and security.90 An example of the national
legislation
adopted
during
this
time
was
the
German
Bundesdatenschutzgesetz of 1990, a federal data protection act that came out
of a German Constitutional Court decision.91
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
laid the foundation for the first broad reaching legal framework concerning
data privacy.92 In 1981 the Council of Europe held a convention for the
protection of individuals specifically discussing automatic processing of
personal data.93 Both the Council of Europe and the OECD recognized a need
for developing a framework that unified privacy and data principles.94 The
drafting and enacting of EU Council Directive 95/46/EC on October 24, 1995
saw their vision of a uniform data protection and privacy framework
realized.95
The 1995 Directive’s objective was to “protect the fundamental rights
and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right to privacy with
respect to the processing of personal data.”96 It defines personal data as
information relating to an “identified or identifiable” person (the “data
subject”), who is anyone who can be identified by reference to “an
identification number or to one or more factors specific to . . . physical,
physiological, mental, economic or social identity.”97 Also important for the
regulation is the “controller” of personal data which can be a natural person,
public authority, agency or other entity that “determines the purposes and
87 Francesca Bignami, European Versus American Liberty: A Comparative Privacy
Analysis of Antiterrorism Data Mining, 48 B.C. L. REV. 609, 609-10 (2007).
88 Helge Seip, Data Protection, Privacy and National Borders, in 25 YEARS
ANNIVERSARY ANTHOLOGY IN COMPUTERS AND LAW 67, 68 (Jon Bing & Olav Torvand eds.,
1995).
89 Colin J. Bennett, REGULATING PRIVACY 101 (1992).
90 Id. at 101-11.
91 Bundesdatenschutzgesetz
Dec. 1990, 20 Gesetz zur Fortentwicklung der
Datenverarbeitung und des Datenschutzes, as amended.
92 Cunningham, supra note 81, at 653.
93 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of
Personal Data, opened for signature Jan. 28, 1981, 108 E.T.S. 1 (entered into force Oct. 1,
1985).
94
Cunningham, supra note 81, at 653.
95 Council Directive 95/46/EC on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31
(EU).
96 Id. at 38.
97 Id.
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means of the processing of personal data.”98 The Directive authorizes
personal data processing only if certain conditions occur. There are
heightened protections afforded to special categories of personal information
including, “race or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical
beliefs, trade-union membership, and data concerning health or sex life.”99 A
judicial remedy addresses breach of the national provisions adopted pursuant
to this Directive.100 The adoption of the TFEU in 2012, which states that
“everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning them,”
reinforced this right.101
C. Recent Developments in EU Data Protection Policy
In 2012, the European Commission decided that the Directive was no
longer current102 and there were gaps in the protection of individuals’
personal data because of rapid technological advances that had taken place.103
The proposed General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),104 which took
effect in May of 2018, is Europe’s proposal to upgrade the principles of the
Directive so as to be most effective in the new digital age.105 The stipulated
goals for the GDPR are: (i) to address the impact of new technologies; (ii) to
enhance the internal market dimension of data protection; (iii) to address
globalization and improve international data transfers; (iv) to provide a
stronger institutional arrangement for the effective enforcement of data
protection rules; and (v) to improve the coherence of the data protection legal
framework.106
The GDPR requires organizations to implement certain technical and
organizational measures in order to secure data subject’s rights and ensure

98

Id.
Id. at 40.
100 Id. at 45.
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102 Protection of Personal Data, EUR. COMMISSION, https://ec.europa.eu/info/aiddevelopment-cooperation-fundamental-rights/your-rights-eu/know-yourrights/freedoms/protection-personal-data_en.
103 Beata A. Safari, Comment, Intangible Privacy Rights: How Europe’s GDPR Will Set a
New Global Standard for Personal Data Protection, 47 Seton Hall L. Rev. 809, 811 (2017).
104 Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016,
on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on
the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection
Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 [hereinafter GDPR].
105 European Commission Press Release IP/12/46, Agreement on Commission’s EU Data
Protection Reform Will Boost Digital Single Market (Dec. 15, 2015),
http://ec.europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-6321_en.htm.
106 See generally Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A
Comprehensive Approach on Personal Data Protection in the European Union, at 7, COM
(2010) 609 final (Nov. 4, 2010).
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the proper processing of personal data.107 It also specifically grants
individuals the right to data portability, which is an additional challenge for
companies holding and processing personal information.108 Criticisms about
the GDPR include it being overly complicated, that the language involves
too much legalese, and that it does not lay out clearly enough the parameters
and methods for achieving its stated goals.109
GDPR introduces a penalty system with significant fines, representing
a significant change for businesses with connections to the EU. Article 83 of
the GDPR provides for two levels of administrative fines for violations of
certain provisions of the law including obligations of the data processor and
controller, certification body, and monitoring body.110 Infringements of any
of these obligations can lead to administrative fines of up to €10,000,000 or
2% of a company’s total worldwide annual turnover, whichever is higher.111
More serious infractions under the law, including violation of a subject’s data
rights, violation of basic principles for processing such as conditions for
consent, or unlawful transfers of personal data to third parties or international
organizations, carry even heavier fines – up to €20,000,000 or 4% of a
company’s total worldwide annual turnover, whichever is higher.112 For large
companies handling a huge amount of data, such as Facebook and Google,
these administrative fines under the GDPR could be enormous, and are likely
to be the highest in the history of regulation.
Competition and data protection have very different origins, but in the
EU especially, they are currently very dynamic areas of the law. Since 2007,
competition enforcement actions in the EU, based on legal principles dating
back to the Treaty of Rome, have become much more commonplace. Data
protection law, on the other hand, has developed and gone through multiple
changes since its introduction in 1995. With the introduction of GDPR, both
bodies of law wield a great amount of power over companies that have a
presence in the EU, giving the EU the power to levy high enough fines that
they could hypothetically force violators to remedy their behavior.
IV. THE 2006 ASNEF-EQUIFAX CASE
In 2006, the Asociación de Usuarios de Servicios Bancarios (Ausbanc)
sued the Spanish consumer credit reference agency Asnef-Equifax and the
credit bureau registration Asnef-Equifax administered for violation of Article
81 of the EC.113 Asnef-Equifax’s credit bureau registration was intended to
107 Lee A. Bygrave, Data Protection by Design and by Default: Deciphering the EU’s
Legislative Requirements, 4 OSLO L. REV. 105, 106 (2017).
108 GDPR, supra note 104, at art. 20.
109 Bygrave, supra note 107, at 119.
110 GDPR, supra note 104, at art. 83.
111 Id. at art. 83(4).
112 Id. at art. 83(5).
113 Asnef-Equifax, supra note 1, at I-11149-50.
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“provide solvency and credit information through the computerized
processing of data”114 which included information related to “the identity and
economic activity of debtors.”115 This sort of information sharing is
commonplace in the credit reporting industry as it allows for a mutually
beneficial business model for consumers, lenders, and the economy.116
Case-law on information exchange agreements indicates that such
agreements violate competition law only if they reduce or remove uncertainty
in market operations so as to restrict competition.117 The court agreed with
Asnef-Equifax and held that the horizontal information sharing was
harmless, arguing that the arrangement would likely “improv[e] the
functioning of the supply of credit”118 and increase the mobility of consumer
credit.119 Whether the proposed consumer benefit has actually manifested
since this decision is unclear, though the global financial crisis would seem
to indicate that it has not.120 Most significantly for the topic of this note, the
court held that “any possible issues relating to the sensitivity of personal data
are not, as such, a matter for competition law”121 and “may be resolved on
the basis of the relevant provisions governing data protection.”122
There are a few plausible reasons for the court’s decision. First,
integration of EU credit markets was at the time a top priority for the EU at
the time and helped facilitate the four freedoms – free movement of goods,
capital, services, and people123 - of the European market.124 Second, there
was little substantive overlap and sometimes even conflict between the two
bodies of law.125 Third, the court viewed data protection law in Europe as
robust and thought that it should be left to function as intended. Though in
2006 these reasons may have held weight, what has transpired since makes
114
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the court’s reasoning less convincing.
The global financial crisis of 2008, which hurt many consumers,
occurred at least partially because lenders were granting loans to consumers
who could not afford them, something information sharing by credit
reporting agencies was meant to prevent.126 Hacking attacks have
proliferated127 and companies making money by controlling and using
personal and private data have amassed enormous market power.128 It is far
from clear that the comprehensive yet reactive GDPR will be sufficient to
protect consumer interests.
Despite the flaws in the Asnef-Equifax v. Ausbanc ruling, the court has
held in a similar fashion in subsequent cases. In 2010, the ECJ held in
AstraZeneca v. Commission that to bring a competition case on the basis of
an abuse of dominant market position, there must be “at the very least
evidence that . . . [the] conduct is such as to restrict competition,”129
effectively excluding causes of action based on privacy concerns.130 The
European Commission cleared the Facebook/WhatsApp merger in 2014
because data concentration was not seen to create competitive concerns.131
However, the 2016 review of that case and new investigation by German
competition authorities may indicate a new willingness from EU authorities
to change their approach when it comes to data protection and competition.132
A change, sooner rather than later, would be well advised as consumer
information becomes more vulnerable and valuable to hackers. In 2011, a
FBI chief cyber official warned of the increasing frequency and severity of
cyber-attacks, and this is exactly what the world has witnessed since.133 In
2017, credit agency Equifax suffered a data breach involving the sensitive
personal information of 143 million people, and globally, nearly two billion
total records have been lost or stolen in the first half of the year.134
Hackers are also increasingly sophisticated in the type of data they
126 See id. at 823. See generally KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE
SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS (2011).
127 Cunningham, supra note 81, at 645.
128 Regulating the Internet Giants: The World’s Most Valuable Resource No Longer Oil,
but Data, ECONOMIST, May 6, 2017, at 1, ProQuest, ID. 1895941741. Alphabet (Google),
Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Microsoft collectively made $25 billion in net profit in the
first quarter of 2017.
129 Case T-321/05, AstraZeneca v. Comm’n, 2010 E.C.R. II-2830, II-3151-52.
130 Giovanni Buttarelli, Strange Bedfellows: Data Protection, Privacy and Competition,
34 COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW. no. 12, 2017, at 1, 2.
131 Commission Decision in Case COMP/M.7217 at ¶ 164.
132 Boot & Petropoulos, supra note 64.
133
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2012,
2:26 PM),
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target, going after the most sensitive consumer information such as medical
records and social security numbers.135 In response, the EU must take steps
to better protect consumers and their fundamental right to privacy.136 A new
method of authentication, biometrics - proposed for use by airports and
financial institutions and implemented on the iPhone - poses an even greater
risk for consumers, since biometric information is even less replaceable than
a social security number.137 Such technological advances for the purposes of
supposedly increased security and convenience make it even more important
to implement strong policies to protect consumer data.
V. ACTIONS THAT EU CAN TAKE
In response to the increased security threat to consumer data, there are
a few different routes the EU can pursue. First, the EU can continue to treat
competition law and data protection law as independent bodies of law,
consistent with the Asnef-Equifax decision. Second, the EU can develop a
new body of law to cover the grey area where competition law and data
protection overlap and conflict. Finally, the EU can choose to apply existing
law differently, namely Article 101(3) of the TFEU, so that consumer welfare
is considered during merger review and competition lawsuits like AsnefEquifax.
A. Separate Treatment of Competition and Data Protection Law
The first option is viable, if not ideal, because of the lengths the EU took
to ramp up and strengthen its data protection law in the last five years. The
EU announced its decision to draft a new regulation that would replace the
1995 Directive in 2012,138 and the GDPR finally became binding and
applicable on May 25, 2018.139 The independent development of data
protection law makes it somewhat similar to sector regulation. There is a
history of various industries, including telecommunications, water services,
electricity, and aviation, adopting sectoral regulation because those particular
industries were exempt from following the standard rules of competition.140
135 Federico Ferretti, The Consumer Interest and Data Protection Under EU Competition
Law: The Case of the Retail Financial Services Sector, 22 EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 485, 510 (2014).
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Sectoral regulation is typically broader in scope than competition law,
going beyond economic considerations to impose technical and access
requirements.141 Likewise, the GDPR covers more ground in the data privacy
and protection space than EU competition law would or could. Traditional
sectoral regulation and data protection regulation diverge when the law
operates: sectoral regulation tends to be proactive, whereas data protection
regulation is reactive.142 This means that it is unlikely the data regulation will
come into play without some sort of data breach event, making it very likely
that consumers will suffer some sort of harm. Despite being the easiest route
for the EU, the threat of increasing consumer harm means the status quo—
—the do-nothing approach——is not optimal.
B. Creation of a New Body of Law
The EU also has the option of drafting an entirely new body of law to
cover the current gap and the occasional conflict between competition law
and data protection law. As already discussed, however, the drafting and
procedural process for enacting new regulatory law is very slow.143 With the
increasing threat of hack attacks, unnecessary delay will be harmful to
consumers and not optimal. Further, many companies, especially technology
companies that process large amounts of data, have expended time, energy,
and resources to understanding and readying for compliance under GDPR.144
These companies would not be happy about having to comply with an
additional, complicated body of law.145 Therefore, this option is the least
viable because it involves the largest amount of government work, would not
offer adequate protection to consumers within the relevant timeframe, and
would exacerbate companies’ frustrations with the already complicated EU
regulation requirements.
C. New Application of Existing Laws
The third path available to the EU is changing how to apply existing
competition law and integrating certain data protection concepts into the
competitive review process. This route, while requiring some work from the
EU, would increase the safeguards on individual data and could even help
companies proactively strengthen their internal data protection systems and
comply with GDPR, before a breach arises. The European Data Protection
Regulators, 70 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 113, 113 n.1 (2011).
141 Id. at 114-15.
142 See id. at 115.
143 See Mira Burri & Rahel Schär, The Reform of the EU Data Protection Framework:
Outlining Key Changes and Assessing Their Fitness for a Data-Driven Economy, 6 J. INFO.
POL’Y 479, 479 (2016).
144 Aliya Ram, Tech Sector Struggles to Prepare for New EU Data Protection Laws,
FINANCIAL TIMES (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/5365c1fa-8369-11e7-94e2c5b903247afd.
145 Burri & Schär, supra note 143, at 488.
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Supervisor (EDPS) recommended as such, proposing that the Commission
broaden the concept of consumer harm to include violation of individual data
rights.146 The hook for this approach would be Article 101(3) of the TFEU,
which allows for an exception to certain competition violations, like an
agreement to share information, if such behavior “contributes to improving
the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic
progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit.”147
During a 2015 speech, Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager
stated that “sometimes, intellectual property rights can be used to restrict
competition” which can “also harm consumers.”148 She concluded that in
situations where intellectual property law does not fully promote consumer
welfare, competition law can be used as a balancing complement.149 One
solution the EU can consider is the interaction between the FRAND patent
standard and competition law.150 A similar scheme can be established
between competition law and data protection law; in situations where
consumer welfare is not fully covered by data protection law, competition
law could be used as a balancing complement. Two situations where this
integrated approach could prove useful are (i) data exchange between
companies151 and (ii) the merging of companies holding large amounts of
consumer data. This solution would be apt considering the similarities
between the European rights-based data protection regime and intellectual
property law.
D. Possible Avenues of Implementation
The first place where this complementary integration can occur is in the
competition law process of merger review.152 While going through the
merger review process, the European Commission can incorporate a review
of the amount of data held by the consolidating entities as well as a review
of their respective privacy policies. The Commission has expressed concern
that consolidation and market power allows newly merged companies to take
data protection less seriously, thereby increasing the risk of harm to
146 Francisco Costa-Cabral, The Preliminary Opinion of the European Data Protection
Supervisor and the Discretion of the European Commission in Enforcing Competition Law,
23 Maastricht J. EUR. & COMP. L. 495 (2016).
147 TFEU art. 101(3).
148 Margrethe Vestager, Comm’r, European Comm’n, 19th IBA Competition Conference:
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151 See Matthew Rosenberg, Nicolas Confessore & Carole Cadwalladr, How Trump
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consumers.153
Like the conditional grant of approval made by the Commission in
Microsoft’s acquisition of LinkedIn, the Commission could make merger
clearance conditional on companies having a robust, post-acquisition GDPR
compliant data protection policy. Incorporating data protection principles
into merger review would lead to stronger protection of consumer
information while giving large companies the opportunity to be proactive in
ensuring a post-close GDPR compliant data protection policy. This approach
would be particularly favorable for companies if the company can use the
post-close GDPR compliance as a defense, and therefore a way to avoid the
severe penalties, should the company experience a data breach in the future.
Competition law violation suits provide a vehicle to integrate data
protection and competition law.154 In contrast to the decision made by the
ECJ in 2006, through Article 101(3)of the TFEU155 the Court could find that
horizontal data sharing is anti-competitive, by failing to provide the
consumer with a fair share of the benefits, unless the data protection policy
is strong enough to adequately protect the consumer data being shared. In the
current age of information, where serious hack attacks are happening more
frequently, a lack of robust and GDPR compliant data protection policies at
all the businesses involved in sharing consumer information will likely lead
to significant consumer harm and few benefits. Adding in data protection
policy requirements would add a layer of protection for consumers and
businesses, making horizontal information sharing more likely to create
mutual benefits.
As discussed above, consumers and businesses both stand to gain from
integrating certain data protection concepts into the competition law
processes of merger review and violation suits.156 Additionally the
government would stand to gain under such a policy. First, consumers will
benefit because their personal data and information will enjoy better
protection. Businesses will benefit because having their data protection
policies placed under review, especially during the merger review process
but also during competition suits like Asnef-Equifax, could help them avoid
steep GDPR administrative fines157 later. The government would also likely
benefit because they would not have to create any new laws to fill the current
gap between competition law and data protection. The caseload for data
protection violations would also likely decrease because of the proactive
153
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prevention of violations. If the goal of the government is to incentivize strong
internal data protection policies for the benefit of consumers, this path is
more sensible compared to the other options.
This would not be the case, however, if the reason for GDPR and the
recent antitrust suits was simply to make money by levying steep fines. It is
interesting to note that nearly all of the companies that have been subject to
merger review scrutiny, competition suits, and possible penalties have been
U.S. companies, and none have been headquartered in the EU.158 Recently
Qualcomm, a U.S. company that manufactures computer chips, was slapped
with a € 997,439,000 fine (approximately $1.2 billion in U.S. dollars) for EU
antitrust violations.159 That U.S. high-tech companies have faced the brunt of
the EC’s antitrust scrutiny has been viewed as self-serving and
protectionist.160 According to a new empirical study on European
Commission merger control between 1990 and 2014, the data does not appear
to support the hypothesis that enforcement in the EU is motivated by
protectionism.161
One possible drawback to the implementation of an integrated data
protection and competition law approach is that it might increase scrutiny
concerning data protection on new market entrants. These companies would
be less likely than their larger competitors to have the resources and expertise
necessary to implement robust internal data protection policies. These high
expectations and regulatory hurdles could therefore lessen competition by
discouraging new market entrants who would have otherwise entered in a
less strict regulatory environment. Independently, GDPR will likely have a
similar effect which means this concern should not be a reason not to use the
integrated approach. In fact, looking forward, the implementation of the
integrated approach would allow the EU to get ahead on protection of even
more valuable consumer data before it hits the mass market. Such data will
include biometric data (fingerprint, retina scan, etc.), electronic medical files,
and DNA profile data, and will likely be widely collected and used by
companies in the near future, to pass through airport security and perhaps
even to make payments.162
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VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the best course of action for the EU is to implement an
approach to competition law which incorporates certain data protection
concepts. This integrated approach would serve as a complement to the
already existing and robust bodies of competition and data protection law in
the EU, and would provide another layer of protection for both consumers
and companies. If implemented correctly it could lessen the risk of harm of
data breach events to consumers, and lessen the risk of penalties faced by
large companies controlling large amounts of vulnerable consumer data.
The integrated approach is optimal because of its relatively low cost to
implement, while offering significant gains to all interested parties: the
consumers, the business community, and the government. The main point of
contact between businesses and the government where this approach can be
put to use is during the process of merger review. Additionally, the courts
would have the option of reviewing and taking into consideration the data
protection policies of companies subject to review as a result of anticompetitive challenges, as was the case with Asnef-Equifax.
European efforts to strengthen data protection law through the
implementation of GDPR, and their increased enforcement of competition
law against big technology companies indicate that Europe is ready for the
added benefits of this integration. Things are very different in the U.S.,
however, and currently it seems unlikely that the integrated approach would
be transferrable to the U.S.163 The first step for the United States will be
developing a uniform data protection law, like the EU’s 1995 Directive or
the 2018 GDPR. Until then, the integration of competition law and data
protection law will remain a European creation.
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eds., 2014).
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